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Executive summary
The automotive sector is currently at the centre of a global transformation, driven by 
four key trends: electrification, autonomous driving, sharing and connected cars. While each 
of these interconnected trends is already visible in daily life, their full deployment is not yet 
guaranteed, nor is the speed of take-up.
This Policy Contribution investigates the position of the European automotive industry 
in a scenario in which electrification substantially progresses.
The results are encouraging for Europe: EU companies entered late the global electric ve-
hicle race, but on the basis of our analysis it is not yet too late for them to catch up and make 
the best of this change.
European car manufacturers can rely on a large internal market, long experience in 
automotive manufacturing and a portfolio of research and development projects and patents 
that is diversified across various power-train technologies. But if Europe wants to succeed in 
the global electric vehicle race, its automotive industry will have to move into higher gear to 
meet the global – notably Chinese – competition. Nevertheless, industry needs the proper 
framework conditions as the basis for more ambitious investments in electrification – as 
examples such as Norway or China demonstrate.
This Policy Contribution formulates a broad policy framework for deployment and 
production of electric vehicles in Europe, combining demand and supply-side instruments. 
Europe cannot follow China in the adoption of centrally-planned industrial policy measures. 
But it certainly can and should do more to stimulate the transformation of its automotive 
industry through more ambitious policies.
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1 Introduction
The automotive sector is important for the European Union economy. Accounting for 4 per-
cent of EU GDP, it employs 8 million people and ranks among the main EU sectors in terms 
of exports and research and development (R&D). And because of its long supply chain, the 
sector has a significant multiplier effect on the EU economy. 
Four disruptive trends are generally considered to be reshaping global mobility and con-
sequently the global automotive industry: electrification, autonomous driving, sharing and 
connected cars. While each of these interconnected trends is already starting to be visible in 
daily life, their full deployment is not yet guaranteed, nor is the speed of their take-up.
We focus on one of these trends: electrification. 
Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly considered a key solution to decarbonise the trans-
port sector, which is becoming the main obstacle to the achievement of the EU’s vision for a 
climate neutral Europe by 2050 (European Commission, 2018). Road transport is responsible 
for about three quarters of the EU transport sector’s emissions. To meet the current EU decar-
bonisation targets, transport would actually have to be completely decarbonised shortly after 
2050. This creates a big window for EVs.
In addition, decarbonising road transport would also be decisive for improving air quality 
in cities, which remains a fundamental challenge for public health in Europe. Air pollution is 
responsible for more than 400,000 premature deaths each year in Europe (EEA, 2016). Pollu-
tion from road transport is a key contributor to this problem.
EVs are increasingly being spotted on EU roads. But the real EV success story is undoubt-
edly China, which has rapidly established itself as the global leader in EV manufacturing and 
where the internal EV market is growing exponentially. Meanwhile, Europe has lagged behind 
in terms of both manufacturing and deployment.
We assess the position and prospects of the European automotive industry in the global 
EV race in a context in which the scope and speed of the ‘EV revolution’ remains uncertain. 
To do so, we look at automotive R&D investment and the latest available versions of patents 
databases. 
This analysis reveals an encouraging picture, in which Europe, although not a frontrunner, 
has not yet lost its leading position in automotive innovation. With the right continuous R&D 
focus in the EU automotive supply chain sector and with the right policy framework on the 
government side, the European automotive sector could not only meet the challenge of the 
global EV revolution, but even drive it forward.
2 The importance of the automotive sector 
for value added 
Value added
Value added is created both in the direct and indirect automotive sectors. The ‘direct’ sector 
includes the manufacture of (1) motor vehicles, (2) parts and accessories to motor vehicles, 
and (3) bodies for motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers. The indirect sector consists of the 
sale of motor vehicles, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles, sale of motor vehicle parts 
and accessories, retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores, and renting and leasing of 
motor vehicles.
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In the EU, the value added of all automotive sectors is considerable. In 2015, it represented 
almost 6 percent of overall value added, making it larger than other major sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals and machinery equipment manufacturing. In some EU countries (Slovakia, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Germany: henceforth the BIG4), the automotive sector 
accounts for more than 8 percent of their total value added (Figure 1).
The indirect sector accounts for half of overall automotive value added in the EU (Figure 
1). The share of the indirect sector is uniform in all EU countries and is generally the largest 
component of overall automotive value added. When looking at the direct sectors, the man-
ufacture of vehicles generates around 2 percent of total value added in the EU. It is especially 
important in the BIG4. The manufacture of vehicle parts also accounts for a large amount of 
value added in the BIG4 and in Romania, Slovenia and Portugal. 
Figure 1: Share of the automotive sector in total value added (2015)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: The indirect automotive sector consists of ‘Sale of motor vehicles’ + ‘Maintenance and repair 
of motor vehicles’ + ‘Sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories’ + ‘Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores’ + ‘Renting and 
leasing of motor vehicles’. ‘Motor vehicles’ include passenger cars, commercial vehicles (vans, lorries and over-the-road tractors for 
semi-trailers), coaches, buses, trolley-buses, snowmobiles, golf carts, amphibious vehicles, fire engines, street sweepers, travelling 
libraries, armoured cars, concrete-mixer lorries, ATVs, go-carts and race cars. Also included are motor vehicle engines (other than electric 
motors) and chassis. ‘Value added at factor costs’ is the gross income from operating activities after adjusting for operating subsidies and 
indirect taxes. Value adjustments (such as depreciation) are not subtracted.
Employment
In terms of employment, the automotive sector accounted for almost 3 percent of the EU’s la-
bour force in 2015 (Figure 2). In the EU and in most EU countries, the indirect sectors account 
for the greatest share of automotive employment, as they include the more labour-intensive 
services such as sales and maintenance. Employment in the capital-intensive direct sectors 
in the EU is concentrated in a few countries. The BIG4 accounts for most of the EU’s direct 
automotive employment.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
EU
28
Sl
ov
ak
ia
H
un
ga
ry
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Ge
rm
an
y
Ro
m
an
ia
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Sw
ed
en
Po
la
nd
Sl
ov
en
ia
Po
rt
ug
al
Sp
ai
n
Be
lg
iu
m
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Fr
an
ce
Au
st
ria
Es
to
ni
a
Ita
ly
Bu
lg
ar
ia
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Fi
nl
an
d
La
tv
ia
Cy
pr
us
De
nm
ar
k
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Cr
oa
tia
Gr
ee
ce
M
al
ta
Ire
la
nd
Share of the automotive sector in otal value ad ed (2015)
Indirect automotive sector
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles
Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles, 
and manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers
Manufacture of motor vehicles
4 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚26 | December 2018
Figure 2: Share of the automotive sector in total employment in 2015
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: ‘Direct employment’ corresponds to the number of people employed in the ‘Manufacture of 
motor vehicles’ + ‘Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles and manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers’ + ‘Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles’. ‘Indirect employment’ corresponds to the number of people employed in the ‘sale of motor vehicles’ + 
‘maintenance and repair of motor vehicles’ + ‘sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories’ + ‘retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised 
stores’ + ‘renting and leasing of motor vehicles’. Total employment corresponds to individuals aged 15 to 64 years.
Research and development
The automotive sector is very important for corporate R&D in Europe. European automo-
tive companies listed in the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard1 spent more than €45 
billion per year on R&D between 2013 and 2016, amounting to more than 25 percent of all 
R&D spending by European scoreboard firms (Figure 3). German firms spend the most in the 
world on automotive R&D. German automotive firms spend around €35 billion per year on 
R&D, or 78 percent of all EU automotive scoreboard R&D. This represents more than half of 
German scoreboard firm spending on R&D.
Figure 3: Automotive and parts R&D expenditure (average 2013-2016) of score-
board firms
Source: Bruegel based on EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2013-2016 and EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2014. 
Note: The R&D data are firm-level, obtained from EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard WORLD - 2500 companies.
1 The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard, created by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, includes 
R&D spending data from the top 2500 R&D-spending firms. By relying on the R&D Scoreboard for R&D figures, we 
exclude the R&D spending of many small firms. 
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Internationally, only Japanese companies spend similar amounts on automotive R&D: 
Japanese scoreboard firms from the automotive sector spend more than €25 billion on R&D, 
or almost 30 percent of all R&D spending by all Japanese scoreboard firms. In the US, these 
figures amount only to €15 billion and 5 percent. South Korea and China account for even 
smaller absolute amounts and shares.
European automotive firms have traditionally held a dominant position in R&D, with the 
top 10 percent of European automotive R&D spenders proportionally outspending the biggest 
automotive spenders from other parts of the world (Figure 4). This strong position has even 
expanded over time.
Figure 4: Europe’s position in global corporate automobile R&D 
 Source: Bruegel based on EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2015.
Volkswagen has traditionally been the corporate R&D leader in the sector, by a substan-
tial margin: in 2015 it represented about 13 percent of corporate automotive R&D, which is 
almost double the share for Toyota, the second largest spender. 
Table 1: Ranking of top automotive R&D spending companies
Rank
2015
Share of 
sector 
R&D
Share of 
sector 
sales
Sector R&D, 
cumulative 
share
1 Volkswagen Germany 12.62% 8.49% 13%
2 Toyota Motor Japan 7.46% 8.62% 20%
3 General Motors USA 6.39% 5.57% 26%
4 Daimler Germany 6.05% 5.95% 33%
5 Ford Motor USA 5.71% 5.47% 38%
6 Honda Motor Japan 5.09% 4.43% 43%
7 Robert Bosch Germany 4.82% 2.81% 48%
8 BMW Germany 4.79% 3.67% 53%
9 Fiat Chrysler 
Automobiles
Italy 3.81% 4.40% 57%
10 Nissan Motor Japan 3.76% 3.70% 61%
32 Tesla USA 0.59% 0.15%
38 Great Wall Motors China 0.36% 0.41%
46 Guangzhou 
Motors
China 0.25% 0.17%
Source: Bruegel based on EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2015.
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In general, the sector is quite stable at the top. The ranking of top automotive R&D spend-
ing companies has remained largely unchanged in recent years; however some young 
firms in the sector have expanded quickly their R&D spending. The most important of 
these young companies come from outside the EU: US-based Tesla and several Chinese 
firms, which with considerable increases in their R&D spending, have climbed several 
dozen places in the scoreboard ranking (Table 1). 
External competitiveness
Vehicles account for 9 percent of EU exports (Figure 5). Vehicles account for more than 
10 percent of exports from the BIG4, but also from Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and Sweden. About two-thirds of EU vehicle exports are traded between EU countries 
(intra-EU). The EU is the major destination and source for the automobiles of most mem-
ber states. Extra-EU vehicle exports are as large as intra-EU exports only for Germany, 
Sweden and Italy. The UK is the outlier country, exporting most of its vehicles to non–EU 
countries.
If exports of vehicle bodies and vehicle parts are also taken into account, total auto-
motive exports account for almost 15 percent of intra-EU exports, of which one-third 
comprises vehicle parts. Trade in vehicle parts reflects the integration of European value 
chains. For smaller countries, a substantial part of intra-EU automotive trade is in parts 
(ie suppliers in European value chains). This is the case for the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Portugal.
Figure 5: Motor vehicle exports to the EU and to non–EU countries as a share of 
total exports of all goods (2017)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: ‘Motor vehicles’ are defined as product code 291 on Eurostat.
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Figure 6: Motor vehicle, body and parts exports to EU countries as a share of total 
exports of all goods to EU countries (2017)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: ‘Motor vehicles’, ‘Bodies’ and ‘Parts’ are defined as product codes 291, 292, and 293 respective-
ly on Eurostat.
The power of the EU as a market
The strong position of the EU in the global automotive sector also comes from its market power. 
The EU and European Free Trade Area countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzer-
land) combined have the world’s largest stock of passenger cars, having grown from 235 million 
to 263 million cars between 2005 and 2015 (Figure 7). By contrast, the US car stock is decreasing. 
The number of cars in use in Japan has remained stable in the past decade but is relatively small 
(61 million in 2015). But the biggest growth comes from China, which is now already similarly 
sized to the US market. Growth in the Indian market has so far been below expectations.
Figure 7: Passenger cars in use
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On the supply side, the EU was traditionally the largest car producer in the world but 
has been overtaken by the spectacular growth of car manufacturing in China. Between 2006 
and 2016, Chinese production shot up from five million to almost 25 million cars per year. 
China’s rise has not crowded out EU production volumes though, which were similar in 
2016 (16.9 million) and 2006 (16.5 million). This can largely be attributed to stable produc-
tion levels in Germany.
Germany remains the world’s largest exporter, accounting for 20 percent of global car 
exports2. Figure 8 shows that German exports have risen to all destination markets, includ-
ing intra-EU, but especially to China. French exports have declined and France has missed 
out on the Chinese market growth. The growth in UK exports is mostly to non-EU countries 
(not including China).
Figure 8: Value of passenger car exports in 2006 and 2016 ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on ComTrade. Note: ‘Passenger cars’ = Motor vehicles for transport of persons (except buses) (HS code: 8703).
3 The trend towards electric vehicles 
The electrification of vehicles has become a key trend in the automotive sector, driven by 
clean energy and climate change concerns and policy interventions – such as support for 
zero-emission vehicles and carbon taxes – intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions3. 
Figure 9 shows how patenting of power-train technologies, which was dominated by internal 
combustion engine (ICE) technology, has started to shift towards cleaner power-train tech-
nologies, of which EV technology has become the most important.
2  Calculated manually using data from UN Comtrade.
3 In fact, the recent electrification trend can be seen as a rebirth. In the early days of vehicle manufacturing, electric 
motors and the internal combustion engine were both in the running to become the dominant power train, but 
low petroleum prices and the problem of the short range of electric vehicles because of battery technology bottle-
necks, the internal combustion engine became dominant.
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Figure 9: Patenting of major power-train technologies
Source: EPO Patstat, April 2018 edition. Note: We count all patents filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in all possible patent 
offices worldwide. By doing so, we only capture ‘high-quality’ patents and avoid double counting. Using only PCT patents, we might miss 
local patenting trends but ensure comparability between the different jurisdictions. Patents are classified according to four different 
power-train technologies. We rely on the classification in Aghion et al (2016) that divides power trains into electric motor technologies, 
hybrid motor technologies, hydrogen motor technologies and internal combustion engine (ICE) technologies. Classification is done via the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) code system. The patent codes used for the classification can be found in Annex 1.
As EV technology has developed, technological improvements have reduced EV produc-
tion costs, in particular by reducing battery costs, further nurturing the development of the 
EV market. Lithium-ion (Li-ion) is the technology of choice for EV batteries, and is expected 
to retain this dominant position during the next decade (IEA, 2018). Prices for Li-ion batteries 
have significantly decreased since their introduction in the 1990s, whether for electronics, for 
residential and utility storage, or for EV-related purposes. Alongside the falling cost of Li-ion 
technology, the scaling up of battery manufacturing capacities in recent years has been a key 
driver of cost reductions for batteries.
EVs are expected to proliferate in the future. To meet commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, more governments will increase their support for zero-emission vehicles, ban 
dirty vehicles and support the deployment of EVs and their charging infrastructure. At the 
same time, EV technology and manufacturing costs are likely to continue to fall as production 
expands. The IEA predicts that the main driver of battery cost reduction will be the scaling up 
of manufacturing capacities (IEA, 2018). Further cost reductions and technology improve-
ments will further boost the development of EV markets. 
Figure 10 depicts various deployment forecasts. All agree on high future growth rates, but 
the most recent forecasts are significantly higher. For instance, BNEF (2017) anticipates more 
than 500 million EVs globally by 2040 – a significant upward adjustment compared to BNEF’s 
prior forecast in 2016.
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Figure 10: Global EV deployment forecasts
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance.
The impact of EVs on automotive supply chains
EV market growth will have major consequences for traditional automotive supply chains, 
which are based on internal combustion. At the manufacturing stage, EVs represent a para-
digm shift compared to ICE vehicles. The mechanical complexity of EVs is less, reducing man-
ufacturing costs the number of workers required in the EV manufacturing process. This could 
mean a significant impact on jobs, requiring a shifting of skills from ICE to EV production and 
also reducing the number of manufacturing jobs. 
In addition, EVs requires less maintenance than ICE vehicles as fewer parts need to be 
replaced over vehicles’ lifetimes (UBS, 2017). This could have significant consequences for 
after-sales service providers that generate large shares of their revenues from service and 
maintenance (UBS, 2017; McKinsey, 2014).
The EV supply chain is also different from that for ICE vehicles. By comparing the con-
tent of a Chevrolet Bolt (EV) and a Volkswagen Golf (ICE), UBS (2017) found that almost 60 
percent of the content of the Chevrolet Bolt originated from outside the traditional supply 
chain, the biggest difference being the battery packs in EVs (Figure 11). A value shift in the 
automotive supply chain implies challenges for EU carmakers and traditional suppliers. For 
one, it could jeopardise huge sunk ICE-related investments (eg in advanced diesel efficiency 
technology). There is also a risk that traditional suppliers and carmakers only capture a small 
share of the value of EVs. This could be especially likely if they lack unique competence in 
battery production and electric motor manufacturing.
However, EVs also provide new opportunities within the automotive sector. The transfor-
mation of the supply chain implies that new suppliers will emerge and capture value, espe-
cially in terms of critical battery technology. Furthermore, as EV production costs continue to 
fall, lower consumer prices will result in higher sales volumes. This can translate into greater 
economies of scale for manufacturers, further increasing the returns on EV-related invest-
ments (UBS, 2017). In addition, rapidly falling battery costs can improve margins for manu-
facturers of electric motors (McKinsey, 2016).
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Figure 11: Breakdown of the manufacturing cost of ICE and electric vehicles ($)
Source: UBS (2017).
Even if in total EVs have a positive effect on automotive supply chains, the disruptive neg-
ative effects might be concentrated in certain regions affected strongly by local suppliers dis-
appearing or relocating. Transport & Environment (T&E, 2017) aimed to quantify the income 
and employment effects of the transition to EVs. T&E (2017) highlighted that the EU will likely 
suffer job losses if traditional suppliers are unable to switch technologies or if engine and 
component manufacturers continue to invest in traditional power-train technologies. In that 
case, the overall number of jobs in the automotive sector would decrease. However, should 
the European automotive sector be able to produce competitive EVs, the overall number of 
jobs in the automotive sector could even grow.
4 The EU and electric vehicles
The EU and the global demand for EVs
Is the EU well-positioned to respond to the EV revolution? Data on registrations of EVs reveals 
two main features: the global EV market remains to date a small part of the overall car market, 
but it is growing rapidly. 
In all major countries, EVs in 2017 had shares well below 5 percent of total vehicle reg-
istrations (Figure 12). Only in Norway did the share substantially exceed 5 percent (making 
Norway an outlier, not shown in Figure 12). The high share of registrations in Norway is 
explained by a broad, time-consistent policy plan. Through a series of small policy steps, 
Norway has put in place an effective policy mix, covering a broad range of interventions: reg-
ulations, direct investment and fiscal advantages. Such a long-term and broad commitment 
has proved effective in changing consumer behaviour. The result is striking. The Norwegian 
EV share of the total vehicle fleet has grown exponentially since 2010, from almost zero in 
2010 to 25 percent in 2017. 
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Figure 12: EV registrations as a share of total passenger car registrations, selected 
countries
Source: Bruegel based on the following data sources: EV registration data: https://www.zsw-bw.de/en/media-center/data-service.htm-
l#c6700 (which in turn sourced data from: “German Federal Motor Transport Authority, ZIV Zweirad-Industrie-Verband, European Alterna-
tive Fuel Observatory, Hybridcars.com, EV Sales, EV Norway, Avere France, FCE, EV Volumes, Department for Transport UK, Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), CAAM, Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland, Bil Sweden, Green Car Reports, auto-schweiz”). Total 
registration data: OICA. Note: EVs in the figure are battery-electric vehicles (BEV) and other electric vehicles (such as Plug-in Hybrid elec-
tric vehicles, PHEV). * The EV registrations data for Germany are rounded by the source. ‘EU’ consists of the UK, France, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden and Spain
However, Figure 12 also shows the strong dynamic in the EV market. EV registrations as a share 
of total car registrations increased in all countries between 2013 and 2017, but more in some than 
in others, with the Chinese market showing the biggest increase in penetration of EVs.
Figure 13 shows EV registrations in a number of countries as shares of global EV registrations. 
While the EU with 23 percent and the US with 48 percent dominated the worldwide EV market in 
2013, by 2017 China had a clear lead, with 48 percent of global EV registrations. Far behind were 
the US with 16 percent and the EU28 with 15 percent. Japan’s share dropped from 13 to 5 percent. 
Within the EU, Germany and the UK increased their shares of the global EV market, while France 
and early adopter the Netherlands experienced declines between 2013 and 2017.
Figure 13: Share of new EV registrations of country in world new EV registrations
Source: Bruegel. For data sources and notes, see Figure 13. 
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The EU and the global manufacturing of EVs
There is a crucial trend in global EV manufacturing: over the last few years, China has rapidly 
established itself as the global leader, leaving Europe and other regions behind. The largest EV 
manufacturers are new Chinese firms (Figure 14, top panel). Japanese and US firms were ear-
ly movers, but only Tesla is currently a leading manufacturer in the global EV market. German 
firms entered late, but are catching up with the early movers.
Figure 14: EV production by vehicle manufacturer and by battery manufacturer
Source: ICCT (2018, p. 5).
In global EV battery manufacturing (Figure 14, lower panel), a crucial part of the EV value 
chain, China’s leadership is even more evident. The first mover, Japan, was rapidly surpassed 
by China between 2014 and 2017 – as Chinese companies proliferated and grew rapidly, as 
along with Korean firms. No EU or US firms are among the world’s major battery producers.
This impressive rise of China in EV manufacturing has been driven by the country’s strong 
industrial policy in the field (Box 1).
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Box 1: Policies to stimulate EV demand: the Chinese Case
China has made the EV industry a priority for its ‘Made in China 2025’ industrial policy, 
which envisages a significant global market share in 10 high-tech industries. In this frame-
work, the Chinese government – at both central and local levels – strongly supports the 
manufacturing of EVs, through measures such as: 
1. Ambitious EV targets, requiring carmakers to meet certain EV quotas in their production4; 
2. Generous fiscal subsidies for EV manufacturers, based on the EV’s driving range per 
charge, to foster innovation; 
3. Requirements for international carmakers to manufacture EVs in China to access the market; 
4. Strong financial incentives for EV purchasers;
5. Extensive charging infrastructure deployment.
Thanks to this strong EV industrial policy, China has secured large investments in EV 
manufacturing plants from Chinese firms and from foreign (notably European) carmakers. 
For instance, in 2017 China secured €21.7 billion of investment from European carmakers in 
EV manufacturing, while Europe secured only €3.2 billion (T&E, 2018).
The EU and EV technology development
Patent data also shows that the EU was not a first mover in EV technology development. EV 
technology patenting activity, while mostly flat until 2005, kick-started globally in 2005 and 
began to grow in Europe in 2009 (Figure 15). Meanwhile, the EU and the rest of the world 
continue with heavy patenting of ICE technologies. 
The dominance of ICE technology in EU automotive patents before 2009 has since been 
changed to a more balanced position across all power-train technologies – electric, hybrid, 
hydrogen and ICE (Figure 15, lower panel). For instance, the number of EU EV patents grew 
from 124 in 2008 to 290-250 per year between 2011 and 2016.
Figure 15: EU versus rest-of-world in major power-train technology patents
Source: Bruegel based on EPO Patstat, April 2018 edition.
4 China passed in 2017 a law mandating carmakers (with annual sales greater than than 30,000 vehicles) to meet fuel 
consumption and EV production targets in order to qualify for new energy credits. Manufacturers that fail to hold a 
given proportion of these credits are fined or must buy credits from other manufacturers.
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In terms of the current specialisations of countries in power-train technologies, EU overall 
is well spread across the various technologies. Within the EU, Germany is by some margin 
the major patenting country. Like the other major patenting countries, Japan and Korea, it is 
spreading its power-train patenting across the four technologies. The US, Tesla notwithstand-
ing, mostly focuses on the incumbent ICE technology. The newcomers India and China are 
still dwarves in terms of numbers of patents, but the patents they do hold are mainly in new 
power-train technologies. 
5 How European automotive firms tackle the 
EV challenge
Although they were not the first movers on EVs, European automotive firms have now be-
come equally buoyant on the EV market. All have announced new EV models and ambitious 
annual EV sales targets to be achieved in the near future (Table 2).
Table 2: Automotive industry EV targets 
Firms Target dates Sales targets
Volkswagen
20
21
-2
02
5
20-30% of sales
Audi 25-30% of sales
BMW 15-25% of sales
Honda
Hybrid, plug-in hybrid, battery electric 
and fuel cell cars to make up two thirds of 
Honda’s European sales by 2025
Mercedes 15-25% of sales
BYD 240k units
GM
20
17
-1
9
30k Bolts in 2017
Ford
20
20
-2
1
40% line-up, including hybrids
Volvo 1m cumulative by 2025
Tesla 1m by 2020
Toyota 1.5m
Nissan 20% of European sales
Changan 400k units cumulative
SAIC 600k units (200k domestic brand)
Source: Bruegel.
With most of the investment in EVs still very recent and/or in the form of announced 
plans, hard evidence on actual investment by EU firms in EV manufacturing is not widely 
available. In order to assess the commitment of EU firms to EV technology, we turn to 
patent statistics to assess how active EU automotive firms have been in developing EV 
technology compared to their international competitors and compared to their activities 
in improving the incumbent ICE technology.
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We rely on patent data relating to automotive and parts firms included the EU Indus-
trial R&D Investment Scoreboard5. Looking at the recent patent activity of the automotive 
companies, we see that different regions exhibit vastly different patent patterns.
Figure 16 shows how the overall patenting activity of countries’ and regions’ automo-
tive sectors is concentrated in a few leading firms. Although challenged by new entrants, 
the automotive sectors have been traditionally dominated by a few major companies. 
That is also reflected in the patenting activity. Patenting by South Korea’s automotive 
sector is dominated by Hyundai; in the US it is General Motors and Ford. The EU and 
Japan, although they have big players such as Volkswagen and Toyota, show a more dis-
tributed structure of patenting activity with more major players involved.
Figure 16: Company shares per technology per region (top 50 automotive, 
JRC scoreboard, 2012-2014)
Source: Bruegel based on EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2016. Note: Car sector as defined by the scoreboard; category 
‘low carbon’ comprises ‘electric’, ‘hybrid’, and ‘hydrogen’; top-50 car (part) makers measured in R&D spending.
There are major differences between the patenting activities of different companies. 
Figure 17 shows graphically the patenting structure of automotive companies, split by 
assembly and part, and by country/region. As we have noted, Chinese companies exhibit 
an overall very low level of patenting.
Among the EU assembly companies, Renault, BMW and Volkswagen have the high-
est shares of electric power-train technology patents, while also having large shares of 
ICE patents. Overall, these EU assembly companies exhibit relatively balanced patent-
ing activity. This contrasts with EU automotive parts companies, which exhibit a much 
greater degree of specialisation when it comes to power-train technologies. Some compa-
nies, such as Mahle and Rheinmetall, are active only in ICE technology patenting. Other 
car parts companies have higher shares of non-ICE patenting, though with low absolute 
numbers. 
The balanced patenting activity is also true for Japanese and US automotive 
assemblers.
5 Note that the JRC database takes into account all kinds of patents, not only Patent Cooperation Treaty patents. To 
avoid double counting, we count patent families instead of patents.
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Figure 17: Patenting structure of the top 50 R&D spending automotive companies 
(2012-14, R&D Scoreboard)
Source: Bruegel based on EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2016. Note: Car sector as defined by the scoreboard; number shows 
patent families; ICE share per company shows ICE patents in total power train patents per company; Company’s share of total electric 
shows company’s share of its electric power train patents in all electric power train patents of the top-50 automotive companies.
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6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
As this Policy Contribution has shown, automotive represents an important sector for the EU 
economy. Ensuring its long-term competitiveness is vital in order to preserve – and cre-
ate – jobs. But this needs to go in hand with protection of the environment and health of its 
citizens. The transition to zero-emission transport and the development of alternative clean 
power train technologies, among which EV technology is most likely to proliferate, needs to 
be supported by more ambitious and broader policies both at EU and member-state levels. It 
is not too late for Europe to lead the global EV race, but it has to step up if it wants to remain at 
the frontier of automotive technology.
Europe can continue with its global leadership of the automotive sector as the next gener-
ation of automotive technologies is phased in. As this Policy Contribution has shown, Euro-
pean car and car parts manufacturers can rely on a large internal market, long experience 
in automotive manufacturing and a portfolio of R&D projects and patents that is diversified 
across various power-train technologies. But Europe must take on global and particularly Chi-
nese competition. EU companies were not among the EV first movers and will have to invest 
more ambitiously in new EV technologies, while reducing faster their exposure to the incum-
bent ICE technology. Too many important companies, especially car-parts manufacturers, 
are still predominantly or even exclusively focused on ICE technologies. The EU lacks strong 
players that can capture the value from batteries for EVs.
It is for the EU automotive industry to face and ideally drive the global EV revolution 
and to take up pivotal positions in the EV value chain. But the proper framework conditions 
should be in place to warrant more ambitious investment in EV by car companies. First and 
foremost, there needs to be demand for EVs. Subsidies, taxation and public procurement 
favouring clean rather than dirty technologies should be used to stimulate demand for clean 
technologies in general, including EVs. On the supply side, the policy menu includes public 
R&D support for the next generation of clean technologies, including support for investment 
in the latest technologies and support for the conversion of dirty technologies into clean. 
Policymakers can also support clean technologies including EV, by establishing efficiency 
standards. Last but not least, a full range of policies can be implemented to bolster infrastruc-
ture deployment: a non-exhaustive list includes urban planning, public transport, charging 
stations and improving access. 
Both the EU and EU member states are increasingly discussing and putting in place poli-
cies to support the deployment of EVs. However, good-practice examples of EV policies from 
Norway and China illustrate that piecemeal interventions will not work. What is needed is a 
broad policy framework, combining a multitude of demand and supply-side instruments in 
an ambitious long-term clean transport policy mix.
The gap in policy ambition between Europe and China is huge. The Chinese EV policy 
mix includes strong commitments to an electric future and coercive measures for carmakers. 
Europe cannot follow China in the adoption of centrally-planned industrial policy measures. 
However, the EU can and should do more to stimulate the transformation of its automotive 
industry through a more ambitious combination of several supply and demand-stimulating 
policy measures.
1) Targeting EU R&D funds to trigger frontier clean technologies
With more than €50 billion annually invested in R&D by the European automotive industry, 
we do not believe that any public R&D funding from the EU Horizon 2020 budget or any 
member state budget can make a substantial difference. However, the EU can improve its 
transport research and innovation funding. In particular, it should carefully allocate this 
money, targeting areas in which it can truly have leverage on private investment. This would 
be the most sensible way to invest the limited available resources (equivalent to 0.2 percent 
of the European automotive industry’s total investment in research and innovation) in areas 
that otherwise might not receive adequate private funding. Transport-related research and 
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innovation funding should notably focus on next-generation early-phase technologies. This is 
particularly the case for batteries, such as solid-state batteries. 
2) Rethinking transport taxation
Taxation is a key policy tool to switch demand to cleaner transport, fostering road transport 
decarbonisation. Different taxes apply throughout the transport system, from the initial 
purchase of a vehicle, to ownership taxes (such as annual registration taxes, company car 
taxation) and usage taxes (taxes on fuel, tolls, road space, parking, commuter tax deductions) 
(Green Fiscal Commission, 2010). 
These taxes can be used to influence user decisions, and possibly also to influence the 
automotive industry’s strategies. For instance, taxes can be differentiated on the basis of their 
carbon emissions. European countries still have very different transport taxation regimes. 
For example, only ten countries consider CO2 emissions in the composition of their vehicle 
registration taxes (ACEA, 2017b). Fuel cost savings – which largely arise from the different 
taxation of gasoline and electricity – provide EVs with an important cost advantage. Savings 
are significant in Norway where running an EV can cost 64 percent less than running a diesel 
or petrol vehicle. In Germany, by contrast, the difference is only 25 percent (Lévay et al, 2017).
The EU should promote a new discussion among EU countries on the future of transport 
taxation, as is being done in the field of digital taxation (European Council, 2017). A harmo-
nisation of mobility taxation throughout Europe would lead to less fragmentation and more 
certainty for business, thus increasing the incentives to invest in production of clean (electric) 
vehicles in Europe. 
3) Cleaning-up cars: stricter emission standards and bans on diesel and petrol cars
In December 2018, the EU reached an agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 
new cars by 37.5 percent by 2030 compared with 2021 (Reuters, 2018). This represents a 
positive step, which will contribute to spur the move towards EVs and other alternatives to 
diesel and petrol cars. However, this is still not sufficient to ensure a deep decarbonisation 
of European transport by 2050. Raising the level of ambition in this field will be crucial in the 
next few years.
Since 2017, a series of countries and cities across Europe have introduced bans on diesel and 
petrol cars. In 2017, France and the United Kingdom announced plans to ban sales of diesel 
and petrol cars and vans by 2040 (Petroff, 2017). Paris is developing a plan to completely 
phase out diesel cars by 2024 and petrol cars by 2030 (Paris, 2018). Copenhagen is discussing 
a proposal to ban diesel cars by 2019 (Embury-Dennis, 2017), while Madrid and Athens are 
considering similar proposals to be applied by 2025 (Brunsden, 2017). In Germany, after the 
country’s highest administrative court ruled in February 2018 that diesel bans were legal, 
several cities have started to draw up diesel bans, such as Hamburg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt and 
Berlin. These plans are mainly driven by a political commitment to reduce air pollution, and 
are based on the expectation that the already underway shift to clean vehicles will continue 
to gather pace over the coming years. The more these plans will be adopted by cities across 
Europe, the strongest the pressure will be on the EU automotive industry to innovate and 
become a global player in clean vehicles.
4) EU support for member states’ transition towards clean transport
The EU should encourage countries and cities to clean-up their transport systems. An ‘EU 
Clean Transport Fund’ could be established to provide dedicated financial support to coun-
tries and cities committed to transport decarbonisation (Tagliapietra and Zachmann 2018). 
For instance, this fund should allow cities to bid for EU money to support measures such as 
the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure or to support the retraining of workers to 
enable them to switch from dirty to clean technology production.
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Annex 1  
Power train technologies and their respective IPC patent codes
Technology IPC patent codes
Electric
B60L 11, B60L 3, B60L 15, B60K 1, B60W 10/08, 
B60W 10/24, B60W 10/26
Hybrid B60K 6, B60W 20, B60L 7/1, B60L 7/20
Hydrogen B60W 10/28, B60L 11/18, H01M 8
Internal combustion engine (ICE) F02B, F02D, F02F, F02M, F02N, F02P
Source: Aghion et al (2016).
